Max Verstappen’s incredible qualifying performance wrenched the Japanese Grand Prix victory from McLaren’s jaws.
You just can’t enact laws for that kind of performance. At Suzuka, the Dutchman once again reminded us of his brilliance.
However, the weekend’s story is not as clear-cut and immediate as that quick, McLaren-centric narrative implies.
Before I get properly got into the wider implications, I thought it prudent to clarify the name of the column: you simply cannot be a journalist of any sort with the first letter S and surname Coop (scoop) and not exploit that. And no, it’s just a fortunate happenstance and opportunity; I didn’t become a journalist because of that.
That’s kind of like the logic that made me think as a youngster that since my name was Sam, I had to be a firefighter when I grew up (Fireman Sam was a popular children’s TV show in the UK in the 1990s), but I’m getting off topic.
Verstappen and Oscar Piastri, who is 12 points behind Suzuka, shared grand prix victories at the first three rounds of the season evenly, leaving Suzuka only one point behind Lando Norris in the race for the F1 drivers’ championship.
But the race’s apparent enduring strategic flaw, which was revealed at McLaren, is far more detrimental than any points swing the Red Bull driver managed to earn.
Dissecting McLaren’s confusing pit stop approach
Due to Suzuka’s famously difficult overtakes, especially in modern Formula One, the race’s outcome was largely determined by the start and strategy, both of which Verstappen expertly handled.
Grand Prix data indicates that the Dutchman had more than enough in hand to put pressure on Norris and react to any attempt to close the distance he had created in the first few laps.
In a two-on-one situation, it came down to the pit stop phase and whether McLaren could take advantage of the Briton and teammate Piastri trailing closely behind the Red Bull.
The Woking crew had a lot of options now, but they chose to be cautious and use both cars rather than take a chance.
In addition to the fact that in Formula One, sometimes the best course of action isn’t, McLaren should have taken a chance with at least one of its drivers but didn’t.
The Woking squad’s strategy was deemed “too conservative” by former racing driver Naomi Schiff, which was evidently the case given how predictable the team was. Mercedes pitted George Russell on lap 19, and McLaren brought Piastri in the next lap to cover him off. Norris and Verstappen entered together at the end of lap 21. Christian Horner claimed after the race that Red Bull anticipated the second McLaren’s arrival, assuming they would be stopped consecutively.
It sacrificed the chasing team’s greatest advantage—the element of surprise—by being so simple to read. McLaren might have managed the pit window by trailing.
By placing Piastri one lap ahead of Verstappen, it did so in many respects, but that alone sets up its most egregious strategic error.
In addition to pitting its drivers in the wrong order, Ferrari did not bring in Charles Leclerc (the car between Piastri in third and Russell in fifth) until lap 21, but he still finished ahead of the British driver, shattering McLaren’s defense for stopping the Australian at that point.
The constructors’ champion doesn’t seem to have learned from the same thing that caused the team to have a lot of problems at the Hungarian Grand Prix last season.
If McLaren had brought Norris in first, he most likely would have been able to undercut the Dutchman and set up a likely victory, especially considering the Red Bull’s lengthy pit stop with Verstappen.
But just calling the issue a strategic weakness fails to recognize the core of the problem, which is its “two number one drivers” stance.
How Verstappen is given the opportunity
This is a little different than the papaya rules controversy, yet it is still more comprehensive. In fact, McLaren was correct on that front.
Piastri was free to race Norris even though the team decided not to switch drivers in the last moments of the grand prix.
Yes, given Suzuka’s characteristics, he was unable to overcome his teammate by himself; yet, he ought to have performed better in qualifying if he had hoped to assault Verstappen.
For better or worse, McLaren was loyal to its principles in that particular moment. Showing directly preferential treatment, especially at this stage of the season, is a formula for catastrophe.
Nevertheless, the team seems afraid of upsetting either driver by making a poor judgment when it comes to strategic differentials.
This results in the Woking squad being paralyzed by indecision, which is not something you want ingrained in your decision-making process. It also limits McLaren’s capacity to gamble because of concerns that it would favor or disadvantage one driver over the other.
The drawback of having two top drivers on a team is this. If Red Bull had played the card McLaren was given at Suzuka differently, you could have reasonably wagered that it would have won the race as well.
However, it is thought that Piastri’s current contract deal includes a clause guaranteeing him parity with Norris in addition to the equal status guarantees he obtained from McLaren.
Given his treatment at Red Bull alongside Sebastian Vettel, Mark Webber, the Australian’s management, made a wise decision. He is well aware of—and possibly still sensitive to—the dangers of being a number two driver.
But it appears to be giving McLaren trouble, and the team’s strategy could end up hurting its drivers in the long run.
But it appears to be giving McLaren trouble, and the team’s strategy could end up hurting its drivers in the long run.
Given that Verstappen is performing at a level that will allow him to stay in the race for the championship and that he will take advantage of every chance that comes his way, McLaren’s present incapacity to roll the dice could be fatal for the championship hopes of both Norris and Piastri’s drivers.
